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In their target article, Krueger, DiDonato, and Freestone provided a detailed and thought-
provoking critique of existing approaches to understanding human behavior in social dilemmas, 
including the famous PƌisoŶeƌ͛s Dilemma paradigm. In this way, they motivate their own approach, 
based on the idea of social projection. This commentary establishes some theoretical relations 
between the social projection hypothesis and a Ŷeǁ ͞ƋuaŶtuŵ inspired͟ model of behavior for the 
pƌisoŶeƌ͛s dileŵŵa game (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009). Our discussion reveals a subtle difference in 
the motivation between the social projection hypothesis and the ͞quantum iŶspiƌed͟ ŵodel, a 
commonality of assumptions (despite the obviously different form of the models), and a 
complementarity of objectives (and strengths). Further elaboration of the two models may well lead 
to a convergence between them, which will further enhance both our insight of the factors which 
drive human intuition in social dilemmas and of the relevant formal principles.  
One of the most famous paradigms for studying social dilemmas and human cooperative 
ďehaǀioƌ is PƌisoŶeƌ͛s Dileŵŵa ;PDͿ, iŶ ǁhiĐh a plaǇeƌ ĐaŶ deĐide to Đoopeƌate ;CͿ oƌ defeĐt ;DͿ ǁith 
another (imaginary or otherwise) player, who can also C or D. A payoff matrix determines the reward 
of the player depending on her choice and on the actions of the other player. The payoff matrix is 
typically set up in such a way that if both players C they receive a relatively high amount (say $20) 
and if they both D a relatively low amount (say $10).  But, if the first player chooses to D and the 
second chooses to C, then the first player receives the highest possible reward ($25) and the second 
player the lowest possible reward ($5; and vice versa). Perhaps the PD paradigm has attracted the 
attention it has because it embodies one of the fundamental riddles of why human societies work: 
mutual cooperation leads to success (prosperity) for all members, but individuals who choose to D 
stand to gain the most (as long as the majority C).  
 A classical rationality view simply predicts that each player should D (the Nash equilibrium is 
for both players to D). In fact, in laboratory versions of the PD task, naïve observers often choose to 
C and so ignore the prescription from classical (selfish) rationality. Understanding the psychological 
mechanism which makes a C decision more  favorable has proved a major theoretical challenge, and 
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is the focus of the target article of Krueger, DiDonato, and Freestone ,titled ͞“oĐial PƌojeĐtioŶ CaŶ 
“olǀe “oĐial Dileŵŵas͟ ;heŶĐefoƌth ǁe ǁill ƌefeƌ to it as just the ͚target article͛ and the authors as 
KDF).  
 KDF provide a detailed overview of alternative theories to account for cooperative behavior 
in social dilemmas, such as PD. For example, they discuss a morality theory, according to which 
cooperation is favored because it is considered a more just or fair strategy. A reciprocity theory 
involves assumptions regarding expectations of how the other player ought to behave. A 
benevolence (social values) hypothesis computes expected reward for a player as a weighted sum of 
the player reward and the reward of the other player. Team reasoning approaches consider reward 
from the point of view of the entire team, not just the individual players. An error approach assumes 
that the optimal strategy is indeed to D, however, players simply occasionally makes errors. Yet 
another explanation for cooperative behavior has to do with observations (or assumptions) 
regarding the preponderance of CC situations (that is, situations in which both players decide to C) in 
particular types of games.  
 KDF͛s ĐƌitiĐal eǀaluatioŶ of these approaches reveals several weaknesses and so motivates 
their own explanation. This depends on social projection, that is, the idea that naïve observers often 
believe that others will behave as they do. Social projection allows a naïve observer to calculate an 
estimate of expected gain for cooperating, under particular assumptions of correspondence in the 
actions of the two players. KDF support their hypothesis with a series of experiments, which are 
based on variations of the PD task. Their social projection hypothesis is the one most consistent with 
the empirical findings, in terms of predicting participant choices (specifically, the recommendations 
for C or D from a participant towards an imaginary player whose actions are given), of predicting 
judgments of rationality for the imaginary player, and of predicting judgments of morality for the 
imaginary player. Support for the KDF is thoughtful, innovative, and, ultimately, convincing.  
 The puƌpose of this ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ is to ĐoŶsideƌ Pothos aŶd BuseŵeǇeƌ͛s ;Ϯ009) modeling of 
PD (and two-stage gambling task) data, on the basis of quantum probability (henceforth, QP). Given 
4 
 
ouƌ optiŵistiĐ ǀieǁ of KDF͛s theoƌiziŶg, oŶe ĐaŶ ǁoŶdeƌ as to ǁhat Đould ďe gaiŶed ďǇ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg 
yet another theory and, indeed, one which is based on unfamiliar formal principles (why is QP 
needed?). As we shall discuss, first, Pothos aŶd BuseŵeǇeƌ͛s (2009) quantum approach enables an 
additional, fundamental perspective regarding the rationality of behavior in a PD task. Second, while 
KDF show that individually any of the existing approaches fail, the quantum theory provides a 
formalization of a combination scheme, which appears to work. In fact, the principles of this 
combination scheme align well with those of the social projection theory. Ultimately, the objectives 
of the quantum model are somewhat different from those of KDF. For KDF, the key objective is to 
explain why naïve observers find it attractive to C in particular PD situations. For the quantum 
model, the challenge is to reconcile behavior in PD situations with formal probability theory. The 
importance of this second issue and the related fundamental implications for the rationality debate 
are considered next.  
A different perspective on the rationality of the PD task 
Shafir and Tversky (1992; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) discussed a variation of the PD task in 
which, in some trials, players were simply told of the oppoŶeŶt͛s deĐisioŶ. UŶsuƌpƌisiŶglǇ, ǁheŶ 
participants were told that the other person chose to D, they chose do D: Prob(D|D)=.97. When 
participants were told that the other person decided to C, they also chose to D, so that 
Prob(D|C)=.84 (a one-shot PD task was employed, so there were no grounds to worry about tit for 
tat or long term strategies). But, ǁheŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe Ŷot told aďout the otheƌ plaǇeƌ͛s aĐtioŶ, the 
probability to C rose, and Shafir and Tversky (1992) observed a Prob(D|unknown)=.63 (for 
replications see Crosson, 1999; Li & Taplan, 2002; Busemeyer, Matthew, & Wang, 2005). Similar 
results were obtained with a two-stage gambling task paradigm, in which participants had to decide 
whether or not to play a second gamble on the basis of knowledge (or not) of the outcome of a first 
gamble (Tversky & Shafir, 1992).  
 Several researchers advocate the view that human naïve decision making and judgment 
follows the principles of classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory. Without doubt, there are some 
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aspects of cognitive process which can be successfully described with CP principles (e.g., Anderson, 
1991; Griffiths et al., 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Indeed, some researchers have suggested that 
human cognition has to follow the principles of CP theory, because it is rational to do so (e.g., 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; cf. Pothos & Busemeyer, in press). For example, the so-called Dutch-book 
theorem guarantees that, as long as you assign probabilities to bets on the basis of CP theory, you 
will neither lose nor gain money.  
 UŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ, foƌ all its Ŷoƌŵatiǀe suppoƌt, CP theoƌǇ fails to eǆplaiŶ “hafiƌ aŶd TǀeƌskǇ͛s 
(1992) results. One of the fundamental axioms of CP theory is the law of total probability, which can 
be expressed as   ሺ ሻ   ሺ  ሺ   ̅ሻሻ   ሺ   ሻ   ሺ   ̅ሻ   ሺ ሻ ሺ   ሻ   ሺ ̅ሻ ሺ   ̅ሻ.  
In other words, the probability of an event A is the sum of the probability of the conjunction of A 
with another event X and the conjunction of A with X͛s ŶegatioŶ. The laǁ of total pƌoďaďilitǇ is 
intuitive: The opponent can either D with some probability  ሺ         ሻ or C with some probability  ሺ         ሻ. If the opponent is predicted to D, then the player has some probability for choosing D,  (                   ); or if the opponent is predicted to C, then the player has some other 
probability for choosing D,  (                   ).  Therefore, when the oppoŶeŶt͛s action is 
unknown, the probability of defection should equal 
  (         )   ሺ         ሻ (                   )   ሺ         ሻ (           ).   
Note that  (         ) is bounded by the two conditional probabilities,  (                   ) and  (                   ), so that it cannot be lower than the lowest of these two conditional 
probabilities or higher than the highest of these conditional probabilities. Empirically, however, the 
observed probabilities do not obey these bounds iŶ the Đase of “hafiƌ aŶd TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭ99ϮͿ variation 
to the PD game. In fact Shafir and Tversky (1992) found that  (         ) was lower than both 
conditional probabilities. Whichever way you manipulate the prior assumptions for whether the 
oppoŶeŶt is likelǇ to C oƌ D, “hafiƌ aŶd TǀeƌskǇ͛s (1992) findings cannot be reconciled with the law of 
total probability.  
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 So, if it is rational for cognitive process to be consistent with the principles of CP theory, and 
if naive observers violate these principles in the case of, e.g., Shafir and TverskǇ͛s ;ϭ99ϮͿ PD task, do 
we have to conclude that people are (mostly) irrational? According to Shafir, Tversky, Kahneman, 
and their colleagues, either we need to accept this bleak conclusion for human irrationality, or adopt 
their proposal that CP theory has little to do with understanding cognitive processes. In a research 
pƌogƌaŵ that has had aŶ eŶoƌŵous iŵpaĐt iŶ psǇĐhologǇ ;e.g., oǀeƌ ϯϬ,ϬϬϬ ĐitatioŶs to TǀeƌskǇ͛s 
work and a Nobel prize for Kahneman in 2002), Shafir, Tversky, Kahneman, and their colleagues 
reported several violations of CP theory in naïve decision making (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974).  
 The first point of this commentary is that none of the theories KDF reviewed can readily 
offer some reconciliation between the violation of the law of total probability and the view of 
human rationality based on adherence to CP principles. Note, again, that the rationality we have 
discussed in this section is different from the one KDF examine, in relation to their model. KDF are 
concerned with whether participant choices to D or C can be considered as rational, given 
expectations for reward. We presented a more general notion of rationality, which arises from a 
consideration of PD behavior from the perspective of formal probability theory. We do not claim 
that aŶǇ of the aĐĐouŶts pƌeseŶted iŶ KDF͛s papeƌ are necessarily inconsistent with a resolution of 
the conflict between the violation of the law of total probability aŶd “hafiƌ aŶd TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭ99ϮͿ 
empirical findings. Rather, a possible resolution is not discussed.  
Quantum probability theory  
For most psychologists, when it comes to the question of how to systematically assign 
probabilities to events, CP theory is all there is.  CP theory is so ingrained that it is hard to even 
imagine alternative probabilistic frameworks. For example, how can it not be that  ሺ ሻ   ሺ   ሻ   ሺ    ̅ሻ?  Nevertheless, in the beginning of the 20th century, physicists realized that 
the way CP theory formalizes uncertainty is often inconsistent with physical observation. As a result, 
and over a period of around three decades, physicists developed quantum mechanics, arguably one 
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of the most sophisticated creations of the human mind, and one which have had an unparalleled 
impact on human history (through the development of transistors, the foundations of chemistry, the  
development of lasers, etc.).  
Quantum mechanics is a theory of physics, which is based on a particular theory of 
probability, QP theory. QP theory can be dissociated from its physical origins and is potentially 
applicable in any area of human inquiry in which there is a need to formalize uncertainty. For 
example, QP theory has been applied in economics (e.g., Baaquie, 2004) and information theory 
(e.g., Grover, 1997). Moreover, the potential relevance of QP theory in psychology can be motivated 
a priori, in terms of various key characteristics of QP theory which appear consistent with general 
intuition about cognitive process (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012).  
    The first characteristic concerns the quantum concept of superposition. Classic cognitive 
models assume that at each moment a person is in a definite state with respect to some judgment. 
Of course, it is not known what the person's true state is at each moment, and so the model can only 
assign a probability to a response with some value at each moment. But the model is stochastic only 
because it does not know exactly what trajectory (definite state at each time point) a person is 
following. In this sense, cognitive scientists currently model the cognitive system as if it were a 
particle producing a definite sample path through a state space. Quantum theory works differently 
by allowing a person to be in an indefinite state (formally called a superposition state) at each 
moment in time. Strictly speaking, being in an indefinite or superposition state means that the 
model cannot assume that you have a definite value, with respect to some judgment scale, at each 
moment in time. You can be in an indefinite state that allows all of these definite states to have 
potential. A superposition state perhaps provides a better representation of the conflict, ambiguity, 
or uncertainty that people experience at each moment. In this sense, quantum theory allows one to 
model the cognitive system as if it were a wave moving across time over the state space. This would 
be so until a decision is made, at which point the state is forced to change from an indefinite state to 
a definite response. 
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A second reason concerns a putative sensitivity of the cognitive system to measurement. 
Traditional cognitive models assume that whatever we record at a particular moment reflects the 
state of the system, as it existed immediately before we inquired about it. The answer to a judgment 
question simply reflects the state regarding this question just before we asked it. One of the more 
provocative lessons learned from quantum theory is that taking a measurement of a system creates, 
rather than records, a property of the system. Immediately before asking a question, a quantum 
system can be in an indefinite state. The answer we obtain from a quantum system is constructed 
from the interaction of the indefinite state and the question that we ask. This interaction creates a 
definite state out of an indefinite state. We argue that the quantum principle, that a reality is 
constructed  from an interaction between the person's indefinite state and the question being 
asked, better matches psychological intuition for complex judgments, than the assumption that an 
answer simply reflects a pre-existing state. 
    The third reason concerns the quantum concept of measurement incompatibility. The 
change in state that results after answering one question causes a person to respond differently to 
subsequent questions. Answering one question disturbs the answers to subsequent questions and 
the order of questioning becomes important. In other words, the first question sets up a context 
which changes the answer to the next question. Consequently, we cannot define a joint probability 
of simultaneous answers to a conjunction of questions, and instead we can only assign a probability 
to the sequence of answers. In quantum physics, order dependent measurements are said to be 
non-commutative and quantum theory was especially designed for these types of measures. Many 
of the mathematical properties of quantum theory arise from developing a probabilistic model for 
non-commutative measurements, including Heisenberg's (1927) famous uncertainty principle. 
Question order effects (e.g., Moore, 2002) are major concern for attitude researchers, and a  
theoretical understanding of such effects can be achieved within quantum theory. 
    The fourth reason is that human judgments do not always obey classic laws of logic and 
probability. The classic probability theory used in current cognitive and decision models is derived 
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from the Kolmogorov axioms, which assign probabilities to events defined as sets. Consequently, the 
family of sets in the Kolmogorov theory obey the Boolean axioms of logic, and one important axiom 
of Boolean logic is the distributive axiom. From this distributive axiom, one can derive the law of 
total probability, which provides the foundation for inferences with Bayes nets. However, the law of 
total probability is violated by the results of many psychological experiments, including Shafir and 
TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭ99ϮͿ ǀaƌiatioŶ of the PD task.  Quantum probability theory is derived from the Dirac and 
von Neumann axioms. These axioms assign probabilities to events defined as subspaces of a vector 
space, and the logic of subspaces does not obey the distributive axiom of Boolean logic. The fact that 
quantum logic does not always obey the distributive axiom implies that the quantum model does 
not always obey the law of total probability.  Essentially, quantum logic is a generalization of classic 
logic and quantum probability is a generalized probability theory. Classic probability theory may be 
too restrictive to explain human judgments. 
    Although the use of quantum principles for modeling psychological processes is still in its 
infancy, there have already been some very promising results (e.g., Aerts & Gabora, 2005; 
Atmanspacher, Filk, & Romer, 2004; Blutner, 2009; Bordley, 1998; Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 
2009; Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Khrennikov, 2010; Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Zamir, & Zwirn, 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Yukalov & Sornette, 2010).  Now that 
we have identified some general reasons for considering a quantum approach to cognition and 
decision, we present our quantum inspired model for the PD game and relate these ideas to the 
social projection hypothesis.  
Quantum model of social projection 
  Pothos and Busemeyer (2009) formulated a quantum model for the PD game , which 
incorporates the idea of social projection, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to ǁhiĐh a plaǇeƌ͛s paƌtiĐulaƌ aĐtioŶ iŵplies a 
belief in a corresponding action by the opponent (in our original work we described this influence in 
terms of cognitive dissonance theory, Festinger, 1957, and wishful thinking, but a characterization as 
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social projection is more accurate). The main ideas are briefly sketched below (see Pothos & 
Busemeyer, 2009, for the full mathematical details). 
   The deĐisioŶ ŵakeƌ͛s teŶdeŶĐies to ŵake iŶfeƌeŶĐes aŶd take aĐtioŶs aƌe based on a state 
vector, which is a unit length vector lying within a four dimensional space. The four coordinates of 
the state represent the ͞pƌoďaďilitǇ amplitudes͟ foƌ the fouƌ eǀeŶts DD, DC, CD, and CC, where the 
first letter indicates the prediction about the opponent͛s action and the second letter indicates the 
plaǇeƌ͛s action. For example, CD represents the event that the opponent is predicted to C but the 
player decides to D.  
The player begins the process with an initial state, denoted by , that contains information 
pƌoǀided aďout the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶ. This initial state ĐoŶĐeƌŶs the plaǇeƌ͛s iŶitial ďiases foƌ aĐtioŶ 
based on corresponding beliefs aďout the oppoŶeŶt͛s intentions.  The initial state can be affected by 
information the player ƌeĐeiǀes aďout the oppoŶeŶt͛s iŶteŶtioŶs. If the player is informed that the 
opponent will D, then the probability amplitudes for DC and DD are initially equal to zero, to produce 
a unit length state denoted D; if the player is informed that the opponent will C, then the 
probability amplitudes for CC and CD are initially equal to zero, to produce a unit length state 
denoted C; aŶd if the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶ is uŶkŶoǁŶ, theŶ the plaǇeƌ͛s initial state is a superposition 
of the two known states  
U = dD + cC  ,  |d|2 + |c|2 = 1. 
This superposition state is interpreted as follows. The player does not necessarily predict that the 
opponent will D, and at the same time, the agent does not necessarily predict that the opponent will 
C. Also the player does not predict both contradictory events to occur at the same time. Instead the 
player is in an indefinite state, in which there is some potential for each prediction to be made. 
The initial state  is then transformed into a final state . The transformation represents the 
thought process, duƌiŶg ǁhiĐh the plaǇeƌ Đlaƌifies heƌ ďeliefs aďout the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶs aŶd heƌ 
own decisions. DuƌiŶg this deliďeƌatioŶ peƌiod, the state is ͞ƌotated͟ ďǇ a uŶitaƌǇ ŵatƌiǆ, deŶoted U, 
to produce a revised state  = U, ǁhiĐh ƌeŵaiŶs uŶit leŶgth. The uŶitaƌǇ ŵatƌiǆ ͞ƌotates͟ the state 
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in a direction that is determined by two factors. One factor is the utility of the payoffs, which 
generates a potential for defection in the PD game (increasing the probability amplitudes for CD and 
DDͿ. The seĐoŶd faĐtoƌ ĐoƌƌespoŶds to KDF͛s soĐial pƌojeĐtioŶ iŶflueŶĐe, ǁhiĐh geŶeƌates a teŶdeŶĐǇ 
for beliefs and actions to become aligned (increasing the probability amplitudes for CC and DD). Both 
factors work together in a dynamic manner to change the initial state into a final state, as a result of 
the deliberation process.   
“peĐifiĐallǇ, if the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶ is known D, then we have  = D, so that, UD = D, if 
the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶ is kŶoǁŶ C, theŶ ǁe haǀe  = C, so that, UC = C, aŶd if the oppoŶeŶt͛s 
action is unknown, then UU  =  U (dD + cC) = dU D + cUC = d D + cC. The final state  = 
U that results after deliberation is another unit length vector, lying within the four dimensional 
spaĐe, ǁhiĐh assigŶs Ŷeǁ pƌoďaďilitǇ aŵplitudes to the fouƌ eǀeŶts DD, DC, CD, CC.  The plaǇeƌ͛s 
decision to D depends on the two probability amplitudes in the state  assigned to DD and CD; the 
decision to C depends on the two probability amplitudes in the state  assigned to DC and CC.  For 
this reason, it is convenient to decompose the state into two orthogonal parts, depending on 
whether the player decides to D or C. Let us denote as  the projection on the defection action for 
the player and as  the projection on the cooperation action for the player, indexed in such a way so 
as to iŶdiĐate kŶoǁledge of the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶs. TheŶ, D = D + D, so that P(player D|known D) 
= D2 and C = C + C, so that P(player D|known C) = C2. 
The keǇ issue ĐoŶĐeƌŶs that happeŶs iŶ the Đase ǁheŶ the oppoŶeŶt͛s aĐtioŶ is uŶkŶoǁŶ. 
Using the above equations, we have:  
UU  =  U (dD + cC) = dU D + cUC = d D + cC = d (D + D)+ c(C + C) ,  
The part of the state vector corresponding to the possibility that the player decides to D is given by 
d D + cC. Therefore, the probability that the player decides to D is:  





In other words, the probability of defection for the unknown condition equals 
 P(player D|unknown) =    |d|2P(player D|known D) + |c|2P(player D|known C) + Int, 
where the interference term equals Int = (d*c)(D͛C) + (c*d)(C͛D).   The interference term may 
be positive, negative, or zero, depending on the angle between the pair of vectors (C , D).  If the 
interference term is zero, then QP agrees exactly with CP theory, and obeys the law of total 
probability. However, to account for the empirical findings, the interference term needs to be 
negative. This is where the social projection factor that affects the rotation of the final state 
becomes important. The social projection factor can make this angle negative, so that the probability 
of defection for the unknown condition falls below both of the probabilities for the known states. 
 Thus, time evolution during payoff evaluation in the quantum model leads to interference 
effects and such interference effects allow coverage of the empirical results in the basic PD 
paradigm. Simply put, probabilities in the quantum model are computed through a squaring 
operation (of amplitudes), so that                     . The first two terms are the 
classical terms, the last two terms the interference terms. In the quantum model, two individually 
good reasons for performing an action (e.g., defecting, in a PD task) can cancel each other out, when 
they are both present. For example, in the PD task, the (good) reason for defecting when the 
opponent  defects and the (equally good) reason for defecting when the opponent cooperates, are 
not consistent with these other. So, when they are both present, the model generates these 
interference effects, and the law of total probability can be violated. In fact, the quantum model 
pƌoǀides a ƌigoƌous foƌŵalizatioŶ of “hafiƌ aŶd TǀeƌskǇ͛s ;ϭ99ϮͿ suggestioŶ that paƌtiĐipaŶts ďehaǀe 
in the way they do in PD tasks (and related paradigms) because of a failure of consequential 
reasoning.  
  One can wonder whether the approach of combining a factor depending on the utility of 
payoffs and a factor depending on social projection could work within a classical (Markov) 
framework for computing probabilities. In brief, this is not possible (see Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009, 
for further details). In the classical model, the state vector U = dD + cC  would be a 
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superposition of probabilities. Therefore, UU  =  U (dD + cC) = dU D + cUC= d D + cC = d 
(D + D)+ c(C + C) would likewise directly involve probabilities, so that,  
P(player D|unknown) =    dP(player D|known D) + cP(player D|known C) 
Note that the classical , , and U can be specified in a way analogous to how they were specified in 
the quantum model, but of course the classical and quantum components are not identical. 
Crucially, the classical expression for P(player D|unknown) is analogous to the one derived for the 
quantum model, but without the interference term. This is another way to say that a classical model 
is always constrained by the law of total probability, regardless of the form of time evolution which 
is employed.  
 GoiŶg ďaĐk to ouƌ disĐussioŶ of KDF͛s pƌoposal, it is clear that the quantum approach is 
ďased oŶ soŵe of the saŵe ideas as KDF͛s soĐial pƌojeĐtioŶ hǇpothesis. However, just the ideas of 
classical rationality and social projection are not sufficient to account for the correct pattern of 
results in PD. As we have seen, a CP model based on exactly these principles is unable to capture 
violations of the sure thing principle. By contrast, the QP model can capture such violations, because 
of interference terms which can arise in probabilistic computation. It is also worth pointing out that 
some aspects of the quantum model can be seen as specific computational formalizations of some 
aspects of the social projection model, notably the idea of social projection. The possible relation 
between the two approaches is further considered in the next section.  
Future directions and final thoughts 
AŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt aspeĐt of KDF͛s deŵoŶstƌatioŶ is that theǇ do Ŷot ƌestƌiĐt theŵselǀes to 
predicting that many participants choose to C (or, in their paradigm, to recommend cooperation), 
but rather they provide empirically accurate predictions across a range of variations of the main PD 
paradigm. Can the quantum model for the PD task reproduce these predictions as well? This is an 
interesting question, but one that warrants considerable additional work. Although the principles 
and form of the quantum model are straightforward, its dynamics are complex. The parameters of 
the model interact and, moreover, can affect not just the amplitude, but also the period of 
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oscillation as well. Therefore, before the model can be extended to provide a more complete 
coverage of results in the PD task and, notably, the insightful variations KDF developed, a more 
complete theory of what is the appropriate time point to extract probabilities from the state vector 
is required. Nonetheless, predicting a violation of the law of total probability from a formal 
probabilistic model is already quite a challenge and this makes us optimistic that these further 
challenges can be overcome as well.  
 This leads naturally to the question of whether a quantum approach provides a better 
account of the (baseline) pattern of results in the PD task only because it affords more 
computational flexibility, compared to the classical one. After all, while the quantum PD model can 
violate the law of total probability, without the interference terms it can also be seen to obey the 
law of total probability. Therefore, is it the case that the quantum model is all of the classical model, 
so to say, and a little bit more (with the introduction of the interference terms)?  
 This is a complicated issue (cf. Myung, 2000; Pitt et al., 2002) but, in brief, there are plenty of 
indications that quantum models are not, in general (just) more flexible than classical ones. First, the 
quantum model is quite general and it has been shown to explain not only the violations of total 
probability found with the PD game (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009), but also other violations of CP 
theory including conjunction and disjunction fallacies (Busemeyer, et al., 2011) and order effects on 
inference (Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2011).  Second, even though quantum models can violate 
certain key constraints of classical models, notably the law of total probability, they are subject to 
alternative, highly restrictive constraints. For example, the matrices (like U, above), which determine 
the dynamics of a quantum model, have to obey a property called double stochasticity. In general, 
CP and QP theory are founded from different sets of axioms (the Kolmogorov and Dirac/ von 
Neumann axioms respectively). Ultimately, whether the success of a model over an alternative one 
is due to flexibility is a technical issue which can only be assessed in the context of specific models. 
So far, this has only been done once. Shiffrin and Busemeyer (2011) compared a quantum model and 
a matched classical one in terms of both model fit and complexity, using a Bayesian approach. 
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Overall, across two different assumptions for the prior distribution of parameters, the quantum 
model was shown to be superior to the classical one. So, while the question of relative flexibility 
between the quantum and the classical models is clearly still open, the existing results are favoring 
the quantum models.  
 Overall, our discussion converges to two broad conclusions. First, the KDF model and the 
quantum model for behavior on the PD task have somewhat different objectives and this endows 
them with complementary strengths. The KDF model was built on the basis of a thorough and 
comprehensive consideration of the relevant psychological processes which could influence 
decisions in PD tasks. By contrast, the starting point of the quantum model was the interest in the 
more general issue of whether it is possible to reconcile human behavior in PD tasks with violations 
of the law of total probability; as discussed, this question is at the heart of the debate of whether it 
is desirable (many cognitive scientists think it is) and possible (researchers following Tversky and 
KahŶeŵaŶ͛s tƌaditioŶ thiŶk it is not) to attempt to understand cognition within a formal probabilistic 
framework. Second, the KDF model and the quantum model, as currently specified, appear fairly 
consistent with each other. It is possible that further psychological elaboration of the quantum 
model and further computational elaboration of the KDF model may lead to inconsistencies between 
the two approaches. Equally, it is possible that such an endeavor will converge the two approaches 
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